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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the response of the stock prices of firms 
based on NASDAQ Select Market, during the Credit Rating Announcements made by 
one of the major rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s, before and after the Great 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The test procedure is the application of the event study 
by which we are going to investigate whether or how much the markets respond to 
Credit Rating Announcements. Furthermore, some important added implications would 
be if the results suggest the existence of an asymmetric response according to the 
differences between upgrading, stable grading and downgrading, or between firms with 
different size of capitalization, as well as whether the strength of the response has 
changed after the 2008.Our empirical research showed that the firms that were assigned 
negative rating before the financial crisis, experienced a strong negative impact on their 
stock price. On the contrary, stable grading or up grading have no strong effect. 
However, it is shown that after the 2008 no Credit Rating Announcement has strong 
effect on the firms’ stock price. An analysis behind this intuition is provided. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We tried to underlie a modern and important question: How much and in which aspects 
has the recent Great Financial Crisis affected the markets and the behavior of the 
investors? In our case we investigated whether and how much the investors’ behavior 
has changed regarding their reaction in a Credit Rating Announcement. 
 
1.1 Why use the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 as a time threshold? 
We chose to conduct our research before and after the financial crisis since its effects 
were spread globally and had a huge impact in various aspects of the world economy. It 
is one of the biggest crises ever seen and we wonder about the impact that it would have 
on the market and the investors in the years to come. In order to understand better the 
importance of it, a small explanatory overview of the crisis will follow.  
It all began from the bubble that was created in the US real estate market. Individuals 
and speculators bought homes, which in general are considered to be illiquid assets, due 
to financing provided by mortgages with artificially low teaser rates for the first years 
and really high later on. The assumption behind that was that either the buyer’s income 
will grow granting him/her the possibility to repay back the loan or the upward trend of 
the value of the houses will be continuous, allowing the buyer to take again a new 
mortgage with initially low rates in order to roll over the debt. In order to avoid the 
exposure to the related high risk, banks tried to minimize and diversified it by 
packaging these debts into long- term securities and selling them to investors. The 
securities were characterized by high liquidity but their buyers used short-term debt for 
the purchase and increased the long term risk of the lenders. Furthermore, instead of 
using the diversification effect in a great extent to minimize the risk, they only managed 
to spread the risk globally. 
When the interest rate on the home buyers’ adjustable rate increased, people could not 
afford to make the repayments. This fact pushed the value of the houses further below 
the value of loans that were taken out to buy them, and the real estate market crashed. 
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Furthermore, home owners couldn’t repay back their loans nor sell their houses and 
banks became unwilling to roll over the relevant short debt, leading the investors to a 
fire sale of the securities, which destroyed their value. Finally, due to the complexity of 
the products and the large diversification the banks did not know the exact extent of 
their exposure to the risks, so they stopped conducting business with each other, 
triggering the credit crunch and the real global economic recession.
1
 
It is quite reasonable that the value of the role of Credit Rating Agencies was widely 
questioned. Hundreds of billions of securities given the agencies’ highest ratings were 
downgraded to junk during the crisis. Rating downgrades have been blamed by EU 
officials for accelerating the crisis since credit ratings have become central features of 
global credit markets.
2
 
So, our investigation mainly focuses to the possible change of the investors’ behavior 
before and after the crisis, toward the Credit Rating Agencies and the rating grading 
that they provide. 
 
1.2 Role of Credit Rating Agencies ,Incentives & Way of Assigning Ratings  
We based our research on the assumption that the Credit Rating Agencies are playing a 
significant role in mitigating the information asymmetry that exists in the market. They 
incorporate price relevant information about the value of the firm in order to bridge the 
gap between the information held by the firm’s management, its current or future 
shareholders and creditors, as it is often necessary to prevent disclosure to various 
competitors regarding information about strategic plans and competitive advantages. 
 
Credit Rating Agencies play a key role by enjoying privileged access to operating and 
financial information about issuers not only from company reports and other public 
sources, but through confidential discussions with key managers and owners as well.   
 
                                                          
1
 Koller et al (2010)  
2
 Alessi (2010)  
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They also have the ability to devote important resources analyzing it and as a 
consequence rating announcements potentially convey new information to market 
participants.
3
 With the significant expansion of the global capital market, Credit Rating 
Agencies play a more and more important role in assessing creditworthiness of bonds 
issued by corporations, packages of asset-backed securities and governments and the 
firms themselves. Especially in the United States rating agencies are exempt from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s fair disclosure regulation. Introduced in 2000, 
Regulation FD prohibits firms from making selective non-public disclosures to market 
participants but allows them to share non-public information with rating agencies. 
Issuers might choose to communicate sensitive information with investors and creditors 
through confidential discussions with Credit Rating Agencies rather than through full 
public disclosure so as to avoid disclosing details to, for example, their competitors
4
. In 
conclusion Credit Rating Agencies analyze risk and provide their analysis to the general 
market in the form of ratings.  
Ratings are used by: 
1) Investors as an independent benchmark of relative credit risk and for monitoring 
purposes.  
They close the information gap between lenders and borrower’s by providing 
independent opinions of credit worthiness reducing the information asymmetry and 
solving the well known “market for lemons” problem since the distinction among 
borrowers with different creditworthiness is more accurate. 
2) Intermediaries as a tool to set initial pricing and by the issuers to diversify 
funding and investor base. Ratings help to more accurately map the interest that 
the lender charges to the true riskiness of the borrower. 
 
3) Issuers as a management surveillance tool since it helps reduce the agency costs 
and align the interests between the investors and the management. 
 
                                                          
3
 Micu  et al (2004) 
4
 Griffin et al (1982)  
  Ederington et al (1987) 
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In general, agencies also improve the market function and efficiency and reduce the 
ability of one investor to outperform another by making better judgments about 
creditworthiness.
5
 
 
1.3 Why is Standard and Poor’s  used as the main Credit Rating Agency? 
Credit Rating is a highly concentrated industry as the so-called big three Standard and 
Poor’s, Moody’s Investor’s Service and Fitch Ratings control approximately 95 % of 
the business. Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s are responsible for 80 % of the global 
market share.
6
 
Standard and Poor’s rating agency has been in the business the last 150 years. It 
remains the world’s leading provider of independent credit risk research and 
benchmarks. They combine global reach with local knowledge with an office network 
of 23 countries and they have more than 1.1 million ratings outstanding. Of all 
corporate sector investment grade ratings issued, just 1 % has defaulted over the most 
recent five year period.
7
  
The above facts and the influence they have in the global market led us to believe that 
Standard and Poor’s is the perfect candidate to base our research on. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Ekbom et al (2014) 
6
 Alessi (2012) 
   Hill (2002) 
7
 Ekbom et al (2014) 
www.standardandpoors.com 
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1.4 Standard and Poor’s Outline of methodology framework:8 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
This figure pictures the methodology of the risk assessment that the Credit Rating 
Agencies follow in order to assign the appropriate rating. First, the risk as a whole is 
divided in two different segments: the business risk and the financial one. After these 
segments are defined then the modifiers are being processed. For the latter, factors such 
as the capital structure, the financial policy or the management’s competence etc. are 
measured. Since they are regarded as factors that could increase or decrease the 
creditworthiness of the firm, they play a significant role before the credit profile of the 
firm is created. Finally, the exogenous factor of group or government influence is taken 
into consideration and the credit rating is assigned. 
We wanted to include in this paper also a table of the different rating categories in order 
to promote a better understanding of the news that they incorporate to the public. 
 
                                                          
8
 Ekbom et al (2014) 
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Investment Grade 
 AAA Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments. Highest rating 
AA Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments 
  A Strong capacity to meet financial commitments, but somewhat susceptible 
 
 to adverse economic conditions and changes in circumstances 
 
         BBB Adequate capacity to meet financial commitments, but more  
  
 
subject to adverse economic conditions 
    BBB- Considered lowest investment grade by market participants 
  
  
 
Speculative Grade 
     BB+ Considered highest speculative grade by market participants 
  BB Less vulnerable in the near term, but faces major ongoing uncertainties 
 
 
 to adverse business, financial and economic conditions 
  B More vulnerable to adverse business, financial and economic conditions, 
 
 but currently has the capacity to meet financial commitments 
 CCC Currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable business, financial and 
 
 economic conditions to meet financial commitments 
  CC Currently highly vulnerable 
     C A bankruptcy petition has been filed or similar action taken, 
  
 
 but payments of financial commitments are continued 
  D Payments default on financial commitments 
    
So each different rating provides different information of the financial health of the firm 
or the securitized product giving the probability of default. Our purpose is to measure 
the market reaction as it is expressed by the changes in the firms’ stock prices. 
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Figure 2 
9
 
The figure above illustrates the probability of default calculated on a sample of debt 
securities rated by Standard and Poor’s in the period of 1981 and 2012.These 
probabilities are corresponding to each single rating at 15 yearly time horizon. We have 
to note that lower rating implies higher risk of default. Thus, it is shown that the 
probability of default is an increasing function of both credit risk and years to maturity. 
For the latter, we have to mention that a longer maturity term entails higher uncertainty 
level of the future conditions. For example we can see that while the average 
probability for securities with one year to maturity that were assigned a rating is 1.6% , 
this ratio would gradually increase to reach its highest level around 11.5% for securities 
with fifteen years to maturity. Also, it is also stated that investment grade securities 
with one year to maturity have 0.1% probability of default in contrast with speculative 
grade ones that their probability of default is 4.1% 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Ekbom et al (2014) 
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1.5 Why NASDAQ? 
We decided to choose the firms of our sample from the NASDAQ’s different categories. 
Since our original objective was to make a comparison between the impacts of Credit 
Rating Announcement on big and small cap firms, it was the most reasonable choice as 
it is already composed by different groups regarding the capitalization distinction. 
NASDAQ itself is the second largest stock exchange in the world by market 
capitalization and it is divided in NASDAQ Capital Market, NASDAQ Global Market 
and NASDAQ Global Select Market. 
“The NASDAQ Capital Market is the equity market for companies that have relatively 
small levels of market capitalization and the listing requirements for this index are less 
stringent compared to the other two”. “NASDAQ Global Market has more strict 
financial and liquidity requirements, as well as strict corporate governance standards”. 
In our research, we came up with 8 firms out of more than 800 that had credit rating 
announcements. Especially, for the small capitalization firms of NASDAQ Capital 
Market only one had rating announcement. Except from the fact that the small cap firms 
do not usually seek for a rating as they finance their needs through other means, another 
possible reason for this outcome might be the high cost of this service. 
“The NASDAQ Global Select Market is a market capitalization weighted index made 
up of US-based and international stocks of firms with large capitalization”. It has strict 
financial and liquidity requirements and our sample is mainly consisted of this group’s 
firms. After careful consideration of more than 1100 firms we found 70 firms that had 
credit ratings, most of them though after the 2008 Financial Crisis.
10
 
 
2. Problem Discussion 
 
To set up our investigation we took under consideration the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis.
11
 The Efficient Market Hypothesis is one of the most important concepts in 
financial theory as it addresses the effects of competition in the financial markets on the 
                                                          
10
 Definitions retrieved from investopedia.com ,(25 August 2013) 
11
 Fama (1970) 
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market prices of securities. It is based on the same assumptions that define the ideal 
capital market. It asserts that at all times a security’s market price fully reflects the true 
rational value of the security; it is fairly priced. For this to occur, the market price must 
reflect all available value relevant information. 
Fama specified the three forms of EMH as: 
1) Weak, when the security price reflects all the historical information. 
2) Semi strong, when both historical and public available information is 
incorporated at the price of the security. 
3) Strong, when historical, public and private information is incorporated at the 
price of the security. 
In our case we assumed the semi strong form of Efficient Market Hypothesis in order to 
conduct the event study and value the effect of new information on the market value of 
the firm.
12
 
So we based our research on the argument that a price response on the announcement of 
a rating change is evidence that agencies provide some information not already 
incorporated in a security or a stock price. 
Credit Rating Agencies can make different types of announcements in order to reflect 
the latest available information about a firm. The attempt to always be updated results 
to multiple announcements that can also lead to the increase of volatility. A great many 
of investors make investment decisions depending on the independent and objective 
ratings from rating agencies. According to Basel Accord II, credit rating is a key 
indicator for credit risk and companies with different credit ratings get different prices 
and economic capital weights. 
Therefore, the changes of credit rating on stock price are important both theoretically 
and practically. However, the financial crisis has brought Credit Rating Agencies in the 
teeth of the storm. Investors are wondering about the accuracy and the objective of the 
rating announcements whether they convey useful information of the certain firm. Do 
the credit rating announcements have the same impact on the stock price before and 
after the crisis?  Do investors react differently toward different types of rating 
                                                          
12
 Ogden et al (2003) 
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announcements due to the financial crisis? These are the practical questions brought out 
to be   investigated. 
 
Our aim is to build a model that would be able to measure the extent in which the credit 
rating announcement of a firm affects its stock prices. We explored the possible 
differences of the impact when it comes to firms with small and big capitalization as a 
firm’s size might be an indicator for the extent of the impact. Also, we wanted to 
analyze whether there is an asymmetric effect (i.e. downgrading of credit rating has 
greater impact than upgrading ones) or not. Finally we divided our test in two different 
time periods, before and after the 2008, year of the financial crisis. The intuition for the 
latter is to see if investors now pay more attention to the ratings although the agencies 
failed to come up with accurate predictions for the creditworthiness of high risk 
financial products that led to the crisis. 
 
3. Data collection 
 
First, we started by selecting the markets from which we would collect our sample data. 
We chose NASDAQ as it is a market broad index and the second biggest in the world 
according to market capitalization. Thanks to its different categories according to the 
firms’ market cap, it is the ideal candidate market to choose our sample from. We used 
NASDAQ Global Select Market for firms with large capitalization and the NASDAQ 
Capital one for the smaller firms. However, as we mentioned before, we had to abandon 
the firms with small cap in the NASDAQ Capital Market since in our process of 
collecting data, only very few of the small firms are rated and thus the appropriate 
sample is unavailable. In terms of the market returns, we needed to use a broad market 
index. We took the Standard and Poor’s 500 index as it covers 500 listed firms in US 
major trading markets. Compared to the Dow Jones Index, S&P 500 contains more 
diversified firms and therefore has better risk diversification, reflecting wider change of 
the market. The Capital IQ database provided us with the dates of the rating events, and 
DataStream the daily stock prices that we need in order to conduct the event study. 
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In order to implement the model, reorganization of data was of great significance for 
the following process.  For stock returns the data from 100 days before of the event day 
to 100 days after the event day were required both for individual returns and the market 
return. Afterwards, we divided the returns into four groups according to their relative 
credit rating actions: upgrading and stable-grading before the crisis, downgrading 
before the crisis, upgrading and stable-grading after the crisis and downgrading after the 
crisis. The intuition behind the combination of upgrading and stable-grading is that 
previous studies show that stock prices usually do not respond in a different way 
whether there is a positive rating; upgrading or stable grading. Furthermore, in this way 
we tried to create bigger groups in order to provide more robust results. 
 
Our total sample of the firms with ratings between the year of 2004 and 2014 is 77. 
Some firms faced severe problems during certain periods, leading to abnormal stock 
trading or even delisting for a long period, which would have made it unable to 
correctly identify the effect of the grading on the company's share price. In addition, it 
could also cause instability of estimation of model parameters within the estimated 
window. For precision, we got rid of these outliers. To be more specific, for each 
subsample we have: a group of 7 for the upgrading and stable-grading before the crisis, 
a group of 2 for the downgrading before the crisis, a group of 54 for the upgrading and 
stable-grading after the crisis and finally a group 14 for the downgrading after the crisis. 
 
For simplification of the follow-up regression, we matched the stock prices of each firm 
(eg.FES) 100 days before of their corresponding announcement days with the index in 
each group (see table 1). What should be mentioned here is that we obtained both stock 
and market returns with the following formula: 
 Rt = ln (Pt / Pt-1).  (1) 
We saved the returns in estimation window in Table 1 
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Table 1 
 
 
As is depicted above, Forbes Energy Services Ltd, with transaction code FES, is listed 
in the first column, followed by its credit rating announcement date 30 May 2012. In 
the fourth and fifth column, we collected and saved its stock returns and corresponding 
market returns of its estimated window, respectively . The same process was repeated 
for each firm. As for the data of the event window which is used for obtaining the 
abnormal returns, we summed up all the firms’ observed returns of each group in the 3-
day event window.  
After finishing this preparatory work, we are turning to the modeling section. 
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4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Event study 
We wanted to conduct a typical event study before and after 2008, the usefulness of 
which derives from the fact that given rationality in the market any effect of an event 
such as a Credit Rating Announcement should be reflected immediately in asset prices 
due to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
 
Event study is an effective method that specifically aims to measure the effects of an 
economic event that can be reflected on the firm’s asset price changes during a certain 
period. For listed companies, the purpose of an event study is to estimate whether the 
company's share price changes abnormally before and after the event. 
 
Basically, there are four steps for a complete event study: 
1) Define the event. The initial step is to determine the event and information of which 
we are going to conduct the research as well as in which period the corresponding 
stock prices are to be collected. 
2) Estimate normal and abnormal returns. Normal returns are considered as the 
expected returns after the event while abnormal returns are calculated by the 
difference between the actual observed returns and the expected returns.  
3) Conduct a test for abnormal returns. Based on the abnormal returns we have 
already observed, we aggregate them and implement a statistical significance test on 
them. 
4) Analyze the result and give interpretation. 
 
 
4.1.1 Definition of the event 
 
 To begin with, we defined the Credit Rating Announcement day as our event day. Then 
our focus is mainly on the measurement of the abnormal returns, making statistical 
inferences about them and aggregating over many event observations. Although the 
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usual procedure in relevant studies for the event window is to be 2 days, our event 
window is set to be three days: [-1, 1].  
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
        T0                                           T1          0          T2                                T3               
Time line for an Event Study          
 
Seen from the figure above, the event window is from T1 to T2, namely the day before 
the announcement, the day of the announcement and the day after the announcement as 
is the usual procedure in relevant studies. The reason for it is the need to capture the 
price effect of the announcement which might occur after the closing of the stock 
market the next day. We adjusted this approach by taking into consideration the day 
before the announcement in order to avoid the case in which the market already knows 
or suspects the rating that is set to be announced. A knowledge that can lead to 
minimizing the effect that otherwise would have happened. A case that could be even 
more possible in our investigation, as our sample is composed mainly by firms of large 
capitalization which are being closely monitored by the market.  
 
Next, the estimation window which is used for estimating the parameters of normal 
return model is shown on the figure from T0 to T1. Generally speaking, there is no fixed 
criterion when determining the length of estimation window. However, if we wrongly 
choose a short estimation window, it may lead to the imprecision of the parameters. 
Also, a rather long estimation window may to some extent cause the changes of data 
structure, meaning that the estimated parameters can also be influenced. According to 
relevant researches the normal length can vary between 60-100 days. In this thesis we 
took 100 days for the reason that within a reasonable range a longer estimation window 
is considered to be more precise. The post event window usually has the same length as 
the estimation one has, but either way is beyond of the scope of our investigation. 
 
Event Window Estimation Window Post-Event Window 
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4.1.2 Estimation of normal and abnormal returns 
 
After setting the length of windows, we proceeded with our work to choose an 
appropriate model to measure the normal returns, also defined as the expected return of 
event window. We decided to adopt the market model to calculate the normal returns 
instead of the other two widely used models: the constant-mean-return model and the 
market adjusted model. Here we used ERit to present expected return of stock i on time t.  
 
The market model is defined as: 
 
                                         ERit = αi + βiRmt      (2) 
 
This model is based on the assumption that there exists a linear relationship between the 
individual expected returns and the market return during the event window. It provides 
a more sensitive adjustment of the return on a stock for contemporaneous market 
returns for two reasons: 
1) The intercept of the regression αi captures the average return on stock I given 
that the market return is zero. 
2) The term βiRmt to captures the sensitivity of returns on stock i to 
contemporaneous market returns.
13
 
 
 According to the comparison that Brown in 1980 and Warner in 1985 have conducted 
to detect the efficacy of different abnormal returns obtained from different 
methodologies and limitations, market model is more effective when employing daily 
or monthly returns. In order to estimate the parameters α and β in the market model, we 
conducted an OLS regression for each group using data in Excel 1. The example 
regression results  are summarized in Table 2.  
 
 
                                                          
13
 Ogden et al (2013) 
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Table 2 
up-stable before down before up stable after down after
c 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003
Std. Error(c) 0.0007 0.0010 0.0003 0.0002
t-Statistic(c) 0.8926 -0.3290 0.7160 -1.5058
P-value(c) 0.3724 0.7425 0.4740 0.1323
β 0.7654 0.8630 1.2324 1.6117
Std. Error(β) 0.0661 0.1146 0.0278 0.0054
t-Statistic(β) 11.5771 7.5325 44.2761 298.7976
P-value(β) 0 0 0 0
R-Squared 0.1611 0.2227 0.2597 0.9846  
 
Seen above, the basic inputs for our OLS regressions are listed for the four groups. 
None of the p-value for the constant is significant. Also, despite of the relatively low R-
squared we obtained , the p-value for  the coefficients of the market returns are all zero, 
indicating that market returns can explain the individual stock returns to a large extent. 
Specifically, only R-squared for the down grating after the crisis is high among the four 
groups.  
  
Before employing the estimates, in order for our parameter estimates to be more 
effective, we implemented a series of tests to examine whether there exist some 
problems to be solved with this time series data. We ran the following tests: 
 White test that showed no heteroscedasticity 
 ARCH test that showed no ARCH effect 
  Unit root that showed stationarity 
 Durbin Watson that showed no autocorrelation.  
 
Afterwards, with the data in Excel 2, we calculated normal returns using the event 
window returns and the estimated coefficients α and β by the market model in each 
group. 
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4.1.2 Test for the abnormal returns 
 
 In terms of abnormal returns, we defined them as the difference between actual 
observed returns and normal returns in event window. In order to acquire the abnormal 
returns, we subtracted the normal returns from the observed returns: 
 
 ARit = Rit - ERit.                (3) 
 
We aggregated the abnormal returns in each group to make overall inferences regarding 
the event of interest and took their average by dividing them with the number of firms 
N. In that way we computed the CAAR (Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns).  The 
reason for which we took the average of CAR (Cumulative Average Returns) is that we 
wanted to eliminate the impact on stock prices which is caused by individual firms. 
Next, we implemented a t-test to observe whether the CAAR would reject the null 
hypothesis that CAAR in [t1, t2] equals zero. To conduct this test, we first computed the 
Variance of the CAR through the variance function of the excel.  We took the average 
of VAR (CAR) to obtain VAR (CAAR), namely divide VAR (CAR) by the number of 
firms N. The test statistic J1 is given by the formula: 
 
J1 = CAAR/ Var(CAAR)
1/2 
~ N(0,1)   (4) 
 
At last, with the increase of degrees of freedom, the t-distribution approaches to normal 
distribution. So we could simply employ the normal distribution because we have used 
a relatively long estimation window of 100 days. We used the function t-dist of excel to 
obtain the corresponding p-value for each group with the confidence interval 0.5: 
 
                         p = 2*(1-NORMSDIST(ABS(J1)))  (5) 
 
There are some assumptions made for the t-test here: First, there is no correlation across 
the abnormal returns of different stocks. Second, the abnormal returns should be 
normally distributed, also event windows of include securities do not overlap in 
21 
 
calendar time, etc.
14
 In general, there are a few alternative test statistics when 
conducting an event study and we were supposed to choose the test statistic with the 
highest power. In this thesis, we adopted the J1 statistic for simplicity, since the test 
results are not likely to be sensitive to this choice over a short event window.  
 
Regarding the investigation of the asymmetric effect, we have to note that the 
application of the relevant z test was avoided due to the specific reorganization and 
categorization of the data. 
 
4.1.4 Analysis and interpretation of the result 
  
Summary of results: 
Table 3 
up-stable before down before up-stable after down after
CAAR 0.0153 0.0213 0.0043 0.0023
VAR(CAAR) 0.0001 0.0001 6.6079E-06 4.1014E-03
J1 1.3061 2.6694 1.6891 0.4643
P-Value 0.1915 0.0076*** 0.0912* 0.6432
Accept Reject Accept Accept  
*, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The summary of the results above lists the main inputs for our test. Since we conducted 
four eviews processes for each group, we obtained four groups of figures.  For example 
in the second column, we got CAAR of 0.0153 of up-stable grading group before crisis 
through previous calculation with returns. Then we used the variance function in excel 
for VAR (CAAR) to get 0.0001. Afterwards we divided CAAR by the square root of 
VAR (CAAR) to obtain J1, 1.3061. Finally we implemented the t-dist function for the 
P-value, which is 0.1915. Because the result of t-dist is greater than the confidence level 
5%, we accept the null hypothesis. The same process was repeated for the other three 
groups. It is very clear that the group upgrading and stable grading before the crisis, 
                                                          
14John Y. Campbell et al, (1997)  
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upgrading and stable grading after the crisis and downgrading after the crisis accept the 
null hypothesis, indicating that the average abnormal returns equal zero in these three 
groups, which means the stock prices do not respond much toward Credit Rating 
Announcements. While the only group that rejects the null hypothesis under 5% 
confidence level is the downgrading before the crisis, showing that market does respond 
to the firms’ downgrading before the crisis. However, we have to note that we were 
unable to create a large enough sample for this specific group in order to provide a more 
robust result. Basically, the general result is consistent with what one would have 
expected intuitively as the financial crisis might have changed investors’ perspective 
toward rating adjustments and thus affect their investment decision.  
 
Our sample led us to the conclusion that after the financial crisis the Credit Rating 
Announcements increased in a great extent. We can see that as a possible reassuring 
move from the rating agencies’ part toward the investors for providing better 
monitoring of the credit worthiness and the value of the firms in the market. However, 
based on our empirical results we can reach the conclusion that the effect of the Credit 
Rating Announcements is now limited especially for the positive and neutral ones. We 
believe that a possible reason might be the fact that investors have tried to extend their 
personal monitoring of the market, which minimizes the effect on their behavior that a 
possible announcement might have. Furthermore, we believe that their behavior also 
indicates that the trust between the investors and the agencies has been compromised
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for various reasons forcing them now to hold a skeptical altitude.  
 
Possible reasons might be: 
 
 Information Asymmetry 
                                                          
15 The Economist print edition (2007)  
 Petroff (2009) 
 
23 
 
To assign a rating to certain corporation or financial products, Credit Rating Agencies 
have to search and collect relevant information as much as possible and evaluate their 
objectives based on it. However, Credit Rating Agencies usually cannot obtain 
sufficient information from their objective corporation or products. In fact, firms intend 
to conceal unfavorable information that will affect ratings thus rating agencies have 
difficulties reach a precise result. For instance, bond issuers never reveal emergencies 
which have negative impact on their capital liquidity. 
 
 Payment mechanism is been suspected 
Theoretically, rating agencies represent benefits of investors while mostly rating fee is 
paid by issuers of firms themselves. Thus, from the investors’ prospective, rating 
agencies may assign high ratings to firms because they may be driven by profits and 
easily be bribed. This conflict may hinder rating agencies from passing objective 
judgment. Intuitively, rating agencies will lose the client if they do not meet their 
clients’ requirement. However, some agencies deny this conflict, stating that rating fee 
charged from single issuer is an extremely small proportion in the whole and thus the 
issuers are not able to have any effect on rating agencies. Before 1970, rating agencies 
charged fee from investors instead of bond issuers. Comparatively, nowadays 90% of 
rating agencies’ revenue comes from issuers. 
However, this mode also conveniently provides to the investors the free ratings of 
hundreds of thousands of firms and financial products; a great service when investment 
decisions are going to be made. At present, investors and other market participants can 
easily obtain numerous of free credit ratings from rating agencies and make comments 
or criticism toward them. Apparently, if the rating agencies charge the investors of 
certain firm or the financial product instead of the firm being rated, they will not put the 
rating results in public. Thus it can be seen that the current payment mode improves the 
transparency of rating standard and rating suggestions. 
 
 Over emphasize the importance of Credit Ratings 
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From the seventies, U.S. SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) established 
NRSROs (Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations) for the reason of 
regulation. NRSROs empowered the major rating agencies special rights and kept 
consolidating their monopoly position in spite of their dissatisfactory performance and 
loss of reputation because these legislations could still bring them enormous benefits. 
According to the Basel Accord, banks whose internal risk management system and 
information disclosure cannot meet the strict criteria should adopt rating results from 
external credit rating agencies. Hence the three major credit rating agencies gradually 
became porters of financial market.
16
 
Besides, investors overvalue the importance of credit ratings blindly due to information 
asymmetry and complication of financial products. Many investors lack thorough 
understanding of certain financial products and therefore Credit Rating Agencies are 
regarded reliable they provide access to undisclosed information. 
 
 Non-transparent rating process  
Credit rating agencies have unpublished important information of firms; therefore they 
have the right to argue in favor of ratings they assign. Although, people hold the view 
that rating agencies have information that individual investors are not likely to obtain, 
they remain unaware of how they conduct the rating adjustments especially in terms of 
downgrading. This non-transparent rating process may have severe negative impacts on 
objective firms, thus lead to a sharp decrease of their share price. In addition, 
opportunistic practice will push it into an even worse situation. During this financial 
crisis, rating agencies did not dispose rating adjustments in time as well as not 
disclosing the supporting reasons, making investors consider they may have 
premeditated plans. 
 
 Avoidance of responsibility 
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 Partnoy (2006) 
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Credit rating agencies state that the ratings are just their own viewpoint and they are 
thus been sheltered from both civil and criminal action. Especially, some district courts 
in the U.S published securities laws that prevent rating agencies to be free of legal 
liability. For this reason, the only consequence the rating agencies have to take is moral 
condemn from the public and loss of reputation. 
 Constraints of pricing models 
To evaluate the complicated financial products, rating agencies have to take many 
factors into consideration. However, rating agencies adopted limited length of historical 
data when modeling, which increased the risk of biased ratings. This drawback of rating 
methods led to underestimation of credit crisis. More specifically, before the financial 
crisis, when rating agencies implemented models to evaluate subprime lending products, 
the data was constrained within the time horizon in which the housing price was likely 
to rise persistently. Without doubt, the combination of both lack of sufficient historical 
data and no former experience from a similar economic situation, led to imprecise 
ratings. Also, precisely estimation of the impacts of some exogenous factors can be 
tough and usually it might be simply ignored in some models e.g. impact on economy 
from rise of oil price.  
 Rating agencies have close relationship with objective firms 
Inevitably, Credit Rating Agencies have close relationship with their objective firms. 
Common firms will take actions to avoid this kind of problems after a series of scandals 
while rating agencies seems that they don’t pay the necessary attention on it. For 
instance, Clifford Leopold Alexander, Jr., Moody’s previous leader of board of 
directors, also had been working in WorldCom Group for 19 years.
17
 During this period, 
WorldCom was assigned fairly good rating under the situation that its bond was traded 
with credit spread which belonged to the category of non-investment, in other words, 
below BBB/Ba. Consequently, the public become to wonder about the independence of 
suspected rating agencies. 
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5.  Suggestions and conclusion 
 
In order to reach our conclusion and after stating the possible reasons for the skeptical 
behavior of the investors, we would like to suggest some possible resolutions regarding 
the role of every counterpart of the market accordingly: the agencies, the government 
and the investors. 
 
 Suggestions for Credit Rating Agencies 
For clearness and investors’ better understanding of credit ratings, rating agencies 
should make their estimation models public as well as historical ratings and previous 
default information of the objective firms. Also, beside the documents and reports the 
firm present, rating agencies should work hard on searching and collecting objective 
information as much as possible, including public records, undisclosed information etc. 
and indentify carefully the authenticity of the materials. In addition, the rating agencies 
should extract experience and draw a lesson from the subprime crisis and try to modify 
and improve their statistical and econometric models under more comprehensive 
assumptions to better suit the current economy and finance condition, presenting us 
with more precise credit ratings. 
 
 Suggestions for government monitoring and regulation 
In order to improve the quality of credit ratings and make the rating agencies more 
responsible for their significant role in the financial market, it is not enough to simply 
rely on their self-supervision and self-regulation. More importantly, the government 
should take actions to better supervise and regulate the rating agencies instead of letting 
things drift. 
First, the government should encourage competitiveness of credit rating industry. One 
of the most important reasons which is accounted for the subprime crisis is the 
monopoly of certain major Credit Rating Agencies. Under such condition, it is not 
possible for the rating agencies to supervise each other and reach a balance because the 
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industry is dominated and controlled by the big three.
18
 As we stated before the big 
three Credit Rating Agencies hold a collective global market share of roughly 95%. 
From our perspective, encouraging competitiveness of credit rating industry may be an 
effective way of improving this situation in which the big three rating agencies almost 
control the whole market.  
Moreover, the government should also regulate the payment method of credit ratings 
especially in terms of corporate bonds. Since the fee for the credit rating is no longer 
influential to the rating agencies, unified standards should be set to prevent the rating 
agencies from increasing the service fee. The government should consider it to be one 
of the market controlling measures for the rating fee as it is also a part of cost of the 
bond. By doing this, the conflict between rating agencies and client firms is remitted to 
some extent. 
 
 Suggestions for the investors 
For millions of investors, credit ratings can be only considered as reference information 
instead of the major decision motivation no matter how precise they could be, letting 
along to replace the methods of risk analysis and management. Investors should hold 
the view that credit ratings are only an instrument for estimating risk and distinguishing 
between different credit qualities. Credit ratings cannot reveal market risk and it is not 
recommendation from rating agencies to sell or buy certain financial products. 
Moreover, because of the complexity of firms’ pecuniary condition or the structure of 
some financial products, it is impossible to mimic them accurately by statistical and 
econometric models in practice even though they may have assumptions and settings 
which seem to be matching. In words, investors should have their own judgment based 
on comprehensive measurements when making investment decision instead of relying 
only on credit ratings. 
 
                                                          
18  Indiviglio ( 2009) 
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In conclusion, through the application of the event study on a sample composed mainly 
by firms selected from the NASDAQ Global Select Market, we investigated the effect 
of a Credit Rating Announcement on the firm’s stock price using the year of the Great 
Financial Crisis as our time threshold. We made a comparison of the effect between and 
after 2007-2008 and our empirical research showed that the firms that were assigned 
negative rating before the financial crisis, experienced a strong negative impact on their 
stock price. On the contrary, stable grading or up grading have no strong effect. 
However, our investigation showed that although the rating announcements were 
increased after the 2008, none of them, positive or negative, has strong effect on the 
firms’ stock price. As we mentioned, investors now hold a more skeptical behavior after 
the Great Financial Crisis for reasons which might be the consequence of losing faith in 
the rating agencies. The world of economy is changing rapidly and is bringing new 
innovations all the time. Investors tend to be equipped with more specialized financial 
knowledge, become more and more rational both through information globalization and 
the lessons they have already learned from previous experience. Relevantly, rating 
agencies should also examine their own conscience carefully, take actions to improve 
themselves to regain their reputation from the public and provide better services for the 
financial market. 
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